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Introduction

The city of New York, as well as some other cities in New York
State, constitutes a single school district.' "The city Board of Education is charged with the general management and control of educational affairs in the city school district,"' but it is subject to the
1. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2552 (McKinney Supp. 1976) (cities of Buffalo, Rochester, Syracuse,
and Yonkers); Id. § 2590-b (McKinney 1970), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1976) (city of
New York).
2. Ocean Hill-Brownsville Governing Bd. v. Board of Educ., 23 N.Y.2d 483, 485, 245
N.E.2d 219, 220, 297 N.Y.S.2d 568, 570 (1969).
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Board of Regents and the State Complenary powers of the State
3
Education.
of
missioner
Local school boards have long functioned within the city school
district, but until recently their functions had been largely advisory,
and they exercised only limited administrative powers, subject to
the City Board of Education.' In 1968 the State Legislature began
the restructuring of the New York City School District., In 1969
major legislation changed the city district from a central system to
a decentralized system.'
The basis of this legislative innovation was a finding by the State
Legislature that greater community "awareness and participation"
were essential both to "excellence" and "innovation" in schools.
The Legislature declared that the "creation of educational policy
units" (i.e., community-based school boards) within the city-wide
school district would provide an opportunity for the community to
take a more active and meaningful role in the schools; and permit
the development of an educational policy "closely related to the
diverse needs and aspirations of the community." 9
In establishing the more than thirty community boards deemed
necessary to implement these legislative findings, the Legislature
also provided for the continuation of the "board of education of the
city school district of the city of New York,"'" and determined that
the educational affairs of the city school district would be under the
general management and control of the City Board."
Thus, in New York City, although power over the schools is
shared between the City Board and the boards of the community
school districts,' 2 "the powers of the community boards are made
subject generally to the policies established by the city board."' 3
3. N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 301, 305 (McKinney 1970), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1976).
4. Ocean Hill-Brownsville Governing Bd. v. Board of Educ., 23 N.Y.2d 483, 485, 245
N.E.2d 219, 220, 297 N.Y.S.2d 568, 570 (1969).
5. 1968 N.Y. Laws ch. 568.
6. 1969 N.Y. Laws ch. 330.
7. 1967 N.Y. Laws ch. 484, § 1.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590-b (McKinney 1970), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1976).
It. Id. § 2552 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
12. Id. §§ 2590-e, 2590-g (McKinney 1970), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1976).
13. New York City School Bds. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 39 N.Y.2d 111, 119, 347 N.E.2d
568, 573, 383 N.Y.S.2d 208, 213 (1976).
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The City Board (and the Chancellor 4 ) are responsible for policy
which has city-wide impact,' while the powers of the community
school board are limited to matters relating to its own community
5 and may not be exercised inconsistently with polischool district"
cies established by the City Board. 7
Despite the clear intent of the Legislature as to the primacy of
authority, and despite a judicial history which has consistently interpreted article 52-A 8 as granting ultimate general management of
the educational affairs to the City Board (subject to the approval
of the Board of Regents and the Commissioner of Education), the
community school boards have contended that they are entrusted
with broad general powers over the everyday workings of the schools
under their charge." The conflicting positions of the community
boards and the City Board with respect to the distribution of power
arise from the statutes defining their respective authorities."' These
statutes appear to overlap, but the inconsistencies disappear when
one recognizes that overall statutory authority is vested in the City
Board.
The legal relationship between the community school boards and
the central City Board is well-defined by both legislation and court
decisions.' The problem is more a political one, described by one
14. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590-h (McKinney 1970), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1976).
15. Kryger v. Board of Educ., 37 App. Div. 2d 622, 623, 323 N.Y.S.2d 777, 780 (2d Dep't
1971).
16. New York City School Bds. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 39 N.Y.2d 111, 119, 347 N.E.2d
568, 573, 383 N.Y.S.2d 208, 213 (1976).
17. N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 2590-e (McKinney 1970), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1976).
18. 1969 N.Y. Laws ch. 330.
19. The courts have consistently rejected such contentions. See, e.g., Kryger v. Board of
Educ., 37 App. Div. 2d 622, 323 N.Y.S.2d 777 (2d Dep't 1971) (integration); Council of Sup'rs
& Adm'rs v. Board of Educ., 73 Misc. 2d 783, 342 N.Y.S.2d 398 (Sup. Ct. 1973), aff'd, 42
App. Div. 2d 930, 347 N.Y.S.2d 555 (2d Dep't 1973), aff'd, 35 N.Y.2d 861, 322 N.E.2d 273,
363 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1974) (appointment and assignment of employees); Comniunity School
Bd. No. 22 v. Board of Educ., 44 App. Div. 2d 713, 354 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dep't 1974)
(conversion of intermediate schools to junior high schools); but cf. Valdivieso v. Community
School Bd. No. 1, 67 Misc. 2d 1007, 326 N.Y.S.2d 105 (Sup. Ct. 1970) (employment of district
superintendent).
20. The powers and duties of the community school boards are enumerated in section
2590-e of the New York Education Law; those of the City Board are in section 2590-g. N.Y.
EDUC. LAW §§ 2590-e, 2590-g (McKinney 1970), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1976).
21. See, e.g., New York City School Bds. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 39 N.Y.2d 111, 347
N.E.2d 568, 383 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1976); Ocean Hill-Brownsville Governing Bd. v. Board of
Educ., 23 N.Y.2d 483, 245 N.E.2d 219, 297 N.Y.S.2d 568 (1969).
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court as a "power or ideological struggle between public entities
created by overlapping statutes [and] performing parallel fiduciary responsibilities."2 2
This Comment will discuss the decentralization legislation and
the interpretation given to that legislation by the courts of this
state. It will consider the conflicting positions of the community
school boards and the City Board with regard to their respective
powers under New York's Education Law.
II.

A History of the Decentralization Legislation

The New York State Constitution mandates that the "legislature
shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free
common schools, wherein all the children of this state may be educated." 3 In general, the Legislature has sought to fulfill this mandate through the creation of local city boards of education.24 Historically, the Legislature has assigned certain powers and duties to local
school board districts," but it has recognized that the educational
affairs of the city school district would be under the general management and control of a central board of education.2"
By the early 1960s, however, there were "conditions existing in the
school system of the city of New York [which shook] public confidence, cause[d] the legislature grave concern and call[ed] for
prompt corrective action." 27 The conditions included:2" (1)
"irregularities in the school construction program"; (2) "serious
hazards in school buildings due to inadequate maintenance and
improper repairs"; (3) "instances of corruption among employees";
22. New York City School Bds. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 39 N.Y.2d 111, 122, 347 N.E.2d
568, 575, 383 N.Y.S.2d 208, 215 (1976). However, it is doubtful whether the situation is as
critical as one proponent of school decentralization indicated when he said, "the school
decentralization controversy puts into clear focus the crucial question of whether meaningful
democracy is possible in the Twentieth Century." Rebell, New York's School Decentralization Law: Two and a Half Years Later, 2 J. L. & EDUC., 1, 38 (1973).
23. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1; N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 101 (McKinney 1970).
24. N.Y. EDUC. LAW art. 52 (McKinney 1970).
25. See, e.g., 1962 N.Y. Laws ch. 615 (current version at N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2564 (McKinney Supp. 1976)).
26. N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 2550, 2552 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
27. 1961 N.Y. Laws ch. 971, § 1.
28. Id. The charges arose from the hotly contested mayoralty campaign in New York City
that summer and led to a request by then Mayor Wagner for the resignation of all those then
serving on the Board of Education. See Lanza v. Wagner, 11 N.Y.2d 317, 183 N.E.2d 670,
229 N.Y.S.2d 380 (1962).
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and (4) "staggering administrative complexities and needless red
tape." The Commissioner of Education warned the Legislature that
the New York City schools faced a time of crisis and urged prompt
corrective action.2 In 1961 the Legislature directed the Board of
Regents and the Commissioner of Education to "submit to the governor and the legislature specific recommendations for such
permanent changes in the laws of the state as they may deem advisable for the organization and more effective administration of the
city school district of the city of New York. . . . ,30 The Board was
3
specifically requested to include recommendations as to: '
a. The powers necessary to ensure the board of education complete freedom
to operate for the best interests of the schools unhampered by restrictive
influence and controls.
b. The revitalization of the present system of local school boards in such
city school district.
c. The effective participation by the people throughout the city of New York
in the government of their local schools.
d. The delineation of functions and responsibilities between members of the
board of education and the superintendent of schools and the administrative
staff of such city school district.

The Legislature had been called into session by the Governor in
response to the sensational charges of corruption and malfeasance
emanating from New York City's vitriolic mayoral election campaign. Although the legislation was primarily intended to eliminate
alleged political corruption through administrative correction, the
Legislature's recognition of the need for effective community participation in the "government" of the schools was a major theoretical
break from past tradition. The Legislature had put in motion the
machinery for the creation of the first decentralization plan based
upon political lines rather than administrative reorganization.:" The
administration of the city school district would remain the function
and responsibility of the City Board of Education "unhampered by
29. 1961 N.Y. Laws ch. 971, § 1.
30. Id.§ 8.
31. Id. The Legislature also reorganized and reconstituted the city's Board of Education,
materially altering the method of effecting appointments to the board. Id. §§ 2, 3. The
constitutionality and propriety of these sections were subsequently upheld. Lanza v. Wagner,
11 N.Y.2d 317, 183 N.E.2d 670, 229 N.Y.S.2d 380 (1962), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 74, cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 901 (1962). This appointment provision (N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 2553(2)) was later
repealed by 1969 N.Y. Laws ch. 330, § 2, effective April 30, 1969.
32. Rebell, supra note 22, at 2.
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restrictive influence and controls.1 33
At the 1962 session the Legislature manifested an intent to decentralize along political lines when it enacted a new section 2564 of the
Education Law. ' The City Board of Education was given discretionary power to divide the city school district into a number of local
school board districts and given complete power to alter, consolidate
or divide such districts' boundaries.3 5 The Board was also given "the
power to appoint, and remove at its pleasure, a local school board
for each such local school board district. . .. ,,3"
Finally, section
37
provided:
2564
The board of education shall have the power to determine the powers and
duties of such local school boards, which shall be advisory only, and shall be
determined in such a manner as to allow the maximum possible participation
by the people of the city of New York in the affairs of the city school system.

At the same time the Legislature recognized that the aim of this
and subsequent legislation was to secure "the most effective possible participation of the people of the city of New York in the affairs
of the city school system, through the development of local school
boards . . . ."I Again, it was clearly the Legislature's intent to
incorporate the local district boards into the central machinery of
the Board of Education, specifically limiting them to an advisory
capacity. For the next six years, the local district boards exercised
only limited administrative powers: "At no time. . . did the Board
of Education have any power or authority to delegate to any local
school board . . . any or all of its functions, powers, obligations, or
duties in connection with the operation of the schools and programs
under its jurisdiction . . . .
By 1967, however, greater community participation was deemed
desirable. On April 19, 1967 the Board of Education committed
33.

1961 N.Y. Laws ch. 971, §8.

34.

1962 N.Y. Laws ch. 615. This bill was prepared under the direction of the New York

State Department of Education and was introduced at its request.
35.

Id. § 3 (creating a new section 2564(1) of the New York Education Law). Section 2564

was later amended. See note 58 infra.
36. 1962 N.Y. Laws ch. 615, § 3 (creating new section 2564(2)).
37. Id. (creating new section 2564(3)) (emphasis added).
38. Id. (creating new section 2564(4)).
39. Ocean Hill-Brownsville Governing Bd. v. Board of Educ., 30 App. Div.2d 447, 449,
294 N.Y.S.2d 134, 136 (2d Dep't 1968), aff'd, 23 N.Y.2d 483, 245 N.E.2d 219, 297 N.Y.S.2d
568 (1969).
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itself to a policy of decentralization "and expressed a desire to experiment with various forms of decentralization and community involvement in several experimental districts."4' On April 24, the Legislature approved an act relating to the organization of the city
school district.' Section one of that act noted that the "creation of
educational policy units within the city school district of the city of
New York for the formulation of educational policy for the public
schools within such district . . . [would] afford members of the
community an opportunity to take a more active and meaningful
role in the development of educational policy closely related to the
diverse needs and aspirations of the community.''42
This was an evident change in the Legislature's intention. In 1961
the reorganization study had centered on the "delineation of functions" among the central board, the school superintendent and the
administrative staff.4 3 In 1967 the Legislature requested a comprehensive plan "for the creation and development of educational policy and administrative units within the city school district of the
city of New York. . . ."I' More importantly, these policy units were
to be given "adequate authority" to perform their new functions." '
The functions were:4" (1) to foster greater community initiative and
participation in the development of educational policy for the public schools within the city district; and (2) to achieve greater flexibility in the administration of such schools.
Although the Legislature did not define "adequate authority,"
the context would strongly suggest that it intended to elevate the
new policy units above the "advisory only" status. In response to the
1967 Legislature's request that the Mayor and the City Board
prepare a comprhensive study and decentralization plan, 7 the
City Board created three decentralization demonstration projects in
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

30 App. Div.2d at 448, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 136.
1967 N.Y. Laws ch. 484.
Id. § 1.
1961 N.Y. Laws ch. 971, § 8.
1967 N.Y. Laws ch. 484, § 2.
Id.

46.

Id.

47.

See text accompanying note 44 supra.
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the city.4" These projects were governed by section 2564;11 the powers
of the demonstration district boards remained advisory only. ' ,'
In 1968 the Legislature adopted the principle of "maximum local
involvement in education," 5 ' and directed that a detailed program
for decentralization be formulated "by the board of education of the
city of New York against the background of urban educational prob" The development of such a community school
-.
lems in the city.
system was to take into account: (1) "the educational needs of the
community and children involved"; (2) "special needs of areas of
low educational achievement"; (3) "the ability of the community to
assume the required responsibilities and initiative"; and (4) "transportation facilities and existing school facilities." 53
The enabling legislation established general criteria for the
Board's plan.54 It was to provide generally for: (1) the establishment
of five to thirty community districts and their boundaries; (2) the
number, manner of selection, terms of office, manner of filling vacancies and election procedures for members of community district
governing boards; (3) the selection, term and compensation of the
community superintendent; (4) the transfer to each community
board of all employees of the city district serving in or in connection
with the schools and programs under the jurisdiction of such community board; (5) the authority to supersede the functions of com48. The projects were established in the Ocean Hill-Brownsville section of Brooklyn, in
the East Harlem Triangle (Manhattan), and in the Three Bridges section of lower Manhattan.
49. See text accompanying notes 34-39 supra.
50. At least one of the demonstration projects included an election of a local school
governing board in Ocean Hill-Brownsville funded by the Ford Foundation. "This election
was not held pursuant to any of the provisions of the Election Law. It was. . . not supervised
by the Board of Education and was not conducted under guidelines laid down by the Board,"
although the City Board apparently acquiesced in the selection of the experimental governing
board. Ocean Hill-Brownsville Governing Bd. v. Board of Educ., 30 App. Div. 2d at 448, 294
N.Y.S.2d at 136.
51. 1968 N.Y. Laws ch. 568, § 1(1). "The need for adjusting the school structure in the
city of New York to a more effective response to the present urban educational challenge
requires the development of a system to insure a community oriented approach to this challenge." Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. § 1(3). Paragraph (3) also provided for publication in local newspapers of a summary of the proposed plan and for the holding of public hearings before the submission of
the plan to the Legislature.
54. Id. § 1(4)(a).
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munity boards by the City Board when necessary; and (6) consistency of community board actions with existing City Board policies.55
As shown by these recommendations, the State Legislature was
firmly committed to the overall hegemony of a central board of
education and recognized that "maximum local involvement in
education" 5 did not necessarily mean autonomy.
The enabling legislation required that the Board's plan grant only
two general powers to the newly created community boards: (1) a
transfer of "all or any" of the functions of the City Board in regard
to the schools in their community districts57 (presumably at the
discretion of the City Board);5" and (2) the power to "enter into all
appropriate contracts with the state and federal governments and
private foundations and agencies, in accordance with rules and regulations of the city board, if promulgated by such board."5 9
In contrast, broad general powers were to be vested in the City
55. Id. Paragraph (4)(a)(5) provided for "procedures for the superseding or assumption
of all or any of the functions, powers, obligations and duties of a community board in any
case where such board has acted, or has failed or refused to act, in violation of law or any
applicable by-law, rule or regulation of the city board or a lawful directive thereof, subject,
however, to appropriate review." Id. Paragraph (4)(a)(6) provided for "the conduct by the
appropriate community board of any matter initiated by the city board in connection with
any function, power, obligation or duty transferred to such community board pursuant to
such plan and pending at the time of such transfer, in the same manner and with the same
effect as if conducted by the city board." Id.
56. Id. § 1(1).
57. Id. Paragraph (4)(b)(1) provides that the community board "shall exercise or perform
all or any of the existing functions, powers, obligations and duties of the city board in relation
to the operation of the schools and programs under the jurisdiction of such community
boards, except as hereinafter provided."
58. 1968 N.Y. Laws ch. 568, § 4 amended section 2564 of the Education Law as follows:
(1) amended subdivision 1 by substituting "shall" for "may" in the first sentence, removing
the discretionary power of the City Board to create local school board districts and directing
the City Board to do so; (2) amended subdivision 2 by inserting "or provide for the election
of [a local school board]," giving the board the option of appointing a community board or
allowing for a supervised local election; (3) amended subdivision 3 to read: "The board of
education, with the approval of the regents, shall have the power to delegate to such local
school boards, any or all of its functions, powers, obligations and duties in connection with
the operation of the schools and programs under its jurisdiction, and may modify or rescind
any function, power, obligation and duty so delegated"; (4) created the position of local school
superintendent. Thus, the Legislature promulgated the paradox of requiring the City Board
to create the local board, but not requiring the City Board to give those local boards any
powers or functions at all.
59. 1968 N.Y. Laws ch. 568, § 1(4)(b)(2). Here again the Legislature has retained the
discretionary power in the central board; the local board may not act inconsistently with the
regulations established by the central board.
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Board of Education,"6 and the City Superintendent.' The City
Board was to "continue to exercise the functions, powers, obligations and duties it [had exercised] pursuant to law, except as proposed to be modified in furtherance of the objectives of [the decentralization law]"; 6" it would modify, adopt and amend the by-laws,
rules and regulations in such furtherance of decentralization; 3 and
it was to continue to "operate such schools and programs as
[might] be desirable." 4 In addition, the City Board would have
authority over educational standards, 5 teacher requirements," purchasing, 7 construction, 6 and employment. It would appoint a City
Superintendent,' who would act under its direction7' as the chief
administrative and executive officer of the city district. 2 He would
60. Id. § 1(4)(c).
61. Id. § 1(4)(d).
62. Id. § 1(4)(c)(1).
63. Id. § 1(4)(c)(2).
64. Id.§ 1(4)(c)(3).
65. Id. § 1(4)(c)(4): "[The City Board shall] promulgate educational standards and
minimum curriculum requirements for all schools and programs in the central district and
community districts."
66. Id. § 1(4)(c)(5): "[The City Board shall] promulgate minimum education and experience requirements for all teaching and non-teaching positions in all schools in the central
district .... "
67. Id. § 1(4)(c)(6): "[The City Board shall] provide for such a system of purchasing for
the central district and community districts as may be desirable and necessary for the proper
operation of such districts."
. 68. Id. § 1(4)(c)(7): "[The City Board shall] acquire all real property and construct all
buildings and appurtenances thereto as may be required by the central district and community districts."
69. Id. § 1(4)(c)(8): "[The City Board shall] be the 'government' or 'public employer' of
all persons employed by the city board and community boards for purposes of article fourteen
of the civil service law."
70. Id.§ 1(4)(c)(9).
71. Id.§ 1(4)(d).
72. Id. § 1(4)(d)(l)-(2). The city superintendent is to have all the powers and duties
provided in section 2566 of the Education Law, except as limited by the City Board in
furtherance of the decentralization objective. Section 2566(1) makes the school superintendent the chief executive officer of the educational system. In addition, he has the duty to
enforce all laws, rules and regulations relating to the management of school activities, to
exercise the delegated administrative and ministerial powers of the board, to prepare the
content of each course of study approved by the board, to recommend suitable textbooks, to
have supervision and direction over district employees including but not limited to the right
to transfer, discipline or suspend subject to the City Board's consideration and action, to have
supervision and direction over course of study, examinations, promotions and all other educational activities and matters, and to issue such licenses as may be required by the Board of
Education. N.Y. EDUc. LAW § 2566 (McKinney 1970).
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be responsible for compliance with the educational standards promulgated by the City Board,7 3 prepare the city district's consolidated budget proposals74 and establish uniform procedures for record keeping.7" Thus, the 1968 legislation was far from a clear mandate to the City Board to promulgate a radical change in the centralized school system. Neither control nor responsibility for educational affairs was to be irretrievably ceded to the local boards; overall supervision would remain in the central board.
III.

The New York City School Decentralization Law of 1969

Article 52-A of the Education Law76 caused a reorganization of the
New York City public school system into community districts.
Passed in 1969 on a message of necessity,7 7 the law was an outgrowth
of the growing political awareness of the city's diverse communities,78 numerous earlier decentralization plans,79 and the Legislature's recognition of the need for decentralization."0
Although the decentralization law has been criticized by both the
courts"' and the commentators82 for its seemingly vague and contradictory provisions, a review of both the legislative history leading to
its adoption and the statutory language employed suggests that
these apparent contradictions resulted from political expediency
and compromise during its passage rather than an inherent inconsistency in the law. Although legislative intent is determined pri73. 1968 N.Y. Laws ch. 568, § 1(4)(d)(3): "[The City Superintendent, under the direction
of the City Board shall] be responsible for compliance with educational standards and minimum curriculum requirements, and qualifications of all personnel in all schools in the central
district and community districts."
74. Id. § 1(4)(d)(4): "[The City Superintendent, under the direction of the City Board
shalli prepare the central district budget proposal; review, modify, increase or decrease
community board budget proposals; and prepare the consolidated budget of the city district."
75. Id. § 1(4)(d)(5).
76. 1969 N.Y. Laws ch. 330.
77. N.Y. CONST. art. 3, § 14.
78. See text accompanying notes 44-53 supra.
79. 1968 N.Y. Laws ch. 568, § 1(1).
80. See 1968 N.Y. Laws 2377 (McKinney) (comments of Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller
on approving 1968 N.Y. Laws ch. 568, June 5, 1968).
81. See, e.g., Community School Bd. No. 3 v. Board of Educ., 68 Misc. 2d 826, 328
N.Y.S.2d 535 (Sup. Ct. 1972); see also, Valdivieso v. Community School Bd. No. 1, 67
Misc.2d 1007, 326 N.Y.S.2d 105 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
82. See generally Rebell, supra note 22, at 1, describing article 52-A as "a patchwork and
highly ambiguous law."
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marily from the language used in the act, 3 the statute should be
read in light of its objectives"4 and historical background. 85 Article
52-A was conceived and drawn to serve two purposes: (1) to give
local groupings of citizens a greater voice in selecting educational
policies appropriate to such local citizenry; and (2) to continue the
central City Board of Education, 8 giving it the power to "determine
all policies of the city district." 7 Thus, even though sections of
article 52-A are subject to ambiguous interpretation,"8 the courts
have construed article 52-A as a whole in accordance with the clear
legislative intent.89
Article 52-A continued the City Board of Education 0 and established a community school board for each community district.8 It
created a Community Superintendent for each such district 2 and
continued the Office of the Chancellor for the city school district of
the city of New York. 3
A.

The Board of Education of the City School District
Broad general powers are vested in the central City Board of

83. See, e.g., Valdivieso v. Community School Bd. No. 1, 67 Misc. 2d 1007, 1008, 326
N.Y.S.2d 105, 108 (Sup. Ct. 1970) refusing to read into the specific statutory delegation of
powers to local boards that they are required to consult with community groups before
selecting a district superintendent.
84. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America v. Chapman, 302 N.Y. 226, 235, 97 N.E.2d 877, 882
(1951).
85. In re Coates, 8 App. Div. 2d 444, 447, 188 N.Y.S.2d 400, 403 (4th Dep't 1959).
86. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590-b(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
87. Id. § 2590-g. "Despite the delegation of educational responsibility by the Legislature
to the local geographic units comprising community districts, it is apparent that, pursuant
to the provisions of article 52-a, supervisory responsibility for the community districts was
retained by the City Board.
Duncan v. Nyquist, 43 App. Div. 2d 630, 631, 349 N.Y.S.2d
154, 157 (3d Dep't 1973).
88. See text accompanying notes 260-64 infra.
89. See notes 81, 84-85 supra. On the general proposition of statutory construction, see
People ex rel. Westchester Lighting Co. v. Gaus, 199 N.Y. 147, 92 N.E. 230 (1910). In Gaus,
the court said, "Doubtless, the legislative intent is inartistically expressed; but, if that intent
can be spelled out from the words of the statute, effect must be given to it." Id. at 149, 92
N.E. at 231. See also Abood v. Hospital Ambulance Serv., Inc., 30 N.Y.2d 295, 283 N.E.2d
754, 332 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1972): "Whenever such intent is apparent, from the entire statute,
its legislative history, or the statutes of which it is made a part, it must be followed in
construing the statute." Id. at 298, 283 N.E.2d at 756, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 880.
90. N.Y. EDUC. LAW, § 2590-b(1)(a), § 2590-g (McKinney 1970), as amended, (McKinney
Supp. 1976).
91. Id. §§ 2590-b(2)(a), 2590-e.
92. Id. §§ 2590-e(1), 2590-f.
93. Id. § 2590-h.
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Education which determines "all policies of the city district."94 In
addition, the City Board was given approval power over determinations by the Chancellor relating to course and curriculum requirements,"5 operation and capital expense estimates throughout the
city district," and school site selection." The City Board is the
public employer of all persons appointed or assigned throughout the
city district,98 and it has control and operation of the city district's
academic, vocational, comprehensive and designated special high
schools. 9 The City Board has supervisory authority over both the
Chancellor and the community school boards. It can "cause the
chancellor to prepare an annual report of the affairs of the city
school system,"'' 9 and "require each community board to make.
periodic reports" of its operations.''
In following an explicit procedural directive of the 1968 Legislature,'02 the City Board was also designated as the appeal board for
matters involving the Chancellor, community boards, and community board members.0 3 This supervisory capacity of the City
94. Id. § 2590-g.
95. Id. § 2590-g(l) (McKinney 1970).
96. Id. § 2590-g(2).
97. Id. § 2590-g(3).
98. Id. § 2590-g(5). However, the City Board must consult with the community boards
with respect to collective negotiations with employee bargaining units when the interests of
the community boards are affected. Id. § 2590-g(6).
99. Section 2590-e of the Education Law gives limited powers and duties to the community boards in regard to the control and operation of all pre-kindergarten, nursery, kindergarten, elementary, intermediate and junior high schools and programs within their respective districts, but such powers may not be exercised inconsistently with policies established
by the City Board. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590-e (McKinney 1970), as amended, (McKinney
Supp. 1976). Effective April 27, 1972 the City Board in its discretion may transfer any such
academic, vocational or comprehensive high schools to the community board of the district
in which it is located provided "it determines the public interest will be served." Id. § 2590g(9) (McKinney 1970). On January 1, 1972 the City Board was given the power and duty to
establish and maintain special high schools in the city district. Id. § 2590-g(12) (McKinney
Supp. 1976).
100. Id. § 2590-g(7) (McKinney 1970).
101. Id. § 2590-g(8).
102. See 1968 N.Y. Laws ch. 568, § 1(4)(a)(5) which created § 2590-1 of the Education
Law, establishing an appeal board for the enforcement of the laws, by-laws, directives, agreements, rules or regulations of the Board of Education.
103. N.Y. EDuC. LAW § 2590-g(10) (McKinney 1970), as amended, (McKinney Supp.
1976). "The chairman of the board shall serve as chief executive officer of such appeal board
and shall have authority to direct that any appeal be considered and determined by a panel
of three members designated by him." Id. § 2590-g(10)(a).
When sitting as an appeal board, it shall have such powers and duties with respect

252

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. V

Board is not restricted to appellate review of the Chancellor's determinations of policy.'"' The powers conferred upon the City Board to
manage and control the educational affairs of the city of New York' 5
include the authority to determine all policies of the city district.
Thus, in Community School Board No. 3 v. Board of Education, 06
a community board sought to enjoin the City Board of Education
and the Chancellor from promulgating or enforcing rules concerning
the "excessing" of personnel.0 7 In dismissing the complaint without
prejudice, the court held that the dispute would best be decided, at
least initially, within the education system itself.0 8 Pursuant to this
holding, the community board appealed to the State Commissioner
to the hearing and determination of appeals as the [State] commissioner of education
shall, by regulation, determine ....
[The designated panel] . . . shall have authority to stay temporarily, pending final determination by the appeal board: (i) enforcement of an order of the chancellor from which the community board is appealing; and
(ii) any action of the community board inconsistent with such order. Upon final determination of an appeal under this section, the appeal board shall issue an order either:
(i) affirming the order of the chancellor; or (ii) modifying or reversing such order if it
is determined to be arbitrary or capricious or contrary to law, regulations or sound
educational policy.
Id. § 2590-g(10)(b) (McKinney 1970). A party aggrieved by a final determination of the
appeal board may appeal to the State Commissioner. Section 310 of the Education Law
makes the decision of the Commissioner of Education on an appeal "final and conclusive and
not subject to question or review in any place or court whatever." His decision is subject to
review only if it is arbitrary. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 6 N.Y.2d 127, 136, 60 N.E.2d 60, 64,
188 N.Y.S.2d 515, 520 (1959).
104. "Other school-related disputes not arising from the exercise of powers conferred upon
the chancellor by Education Law § 2590-I are not . . . reviewable by the city board within
the exercise of appellate jurisdiction but must nevertheless be brought to the city board in
its administrative capacity under the rule of law which requires that administrative remedies
be exhausted prior to commencement of proceedings to secure judicial review." In re Tilden
High School P.T.A., 12 [N.Y.] Educ. Dep't Rep. 176, 178-79 (1973).
105. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2552 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
106. 68 Misc. 2d 66, 326 N.Y.S.2d 130 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
107. Id., 326 N.Y.S.2d at 131. The term "excessing" refers to the situation in the City
District where as the result of budgetary stringencies it was necessary to reduce teaching
staffs in various schools in the city. The conflict in Community School Board No. 3 arose from
the community school board's desire to "excess" teachers on the basis of educational criteria
rather than guidelines which were promulgated by the Chancellor and which required that
substitute teachers be laid off first, and then probationary teachers in inverse order of seniority, and that such seniority be determined on a city-wide basis. Id. at 66-67, 326 N.Y.S.2d
at 131-32.
108. 68 Misc. 2d at 67, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 132. "With respect to the problems of excessing
and tenure . . . a strong argument can be made that these are problems that affect more
than one community school district and thus must be made subject to centrally determined
city wide policies to be established by the city Board of Education." Id. (citations omitted).
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of Education'" who dismissed the appeal holding that the community boards must defer to the City Board when uniformity of
policy throughout the City School District is necessary.110
By analogy, just as the State Board of Regents has state-wide
powers, the City Board enjoys similiar autonomy within the city
district."'
B. The Chancellor of the New York City School District
The Office of the Chancellor was created to exercise the powers
and duties of the former Superintendent of Schools of the city school
district."2 However, the Chancellor must "exercise all his powers
and duties in a manner not inconsistent with the policies of the City
Board,""' by whom he is employed." 4
The broad language of section 2590-h empowers the Chancellor to
act as both the chief administrative and executive officer of the city
district."5 Among his administrative powers are the power to establish, control, operate, or discontinue senior high schools, special
109. In re Community School Bd. No. 3, 11 [N.Y.] Educ. Dep't Rep. 154 (1972).
110. "The broad grant of power to the community boards with respect to the control and
operation of pre-kindergarten through junior high school programs within the community
district provided by Education Law § 2590-e is tempered by the proviso that their powers be
'... not inconsistent with the provisions of [article 52-A] and the policies established by
the city board." Id. at 156-57.
For a similiar case in the state courts, see Council of Sup'rs and Adm'rs v. Board of Educ.,
73 Misc. 2d 783, 342 N.Y.S.2d 398 (Sup. Ct. 1973), holding that the statutory power of the
community boards to appoint and assign supervisory personnel must yield to the superior
power of the City Board of Education to establish a city-wide uniform policy for excessing or
interdistrict transferring of personnel.
Ill. New York City School Bds. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 39 N.Y.2d 111, 119, 347 N.E.2d
568, 573, 383 N.Y.S.2d 208, 213 (1976).
112. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590-h (McKinney 1970), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1976).
See text accompanying notes 70-75 supra. According to section 2566 of the New York Education Law, the superintendent of schools is charged with specific limited duties "subject to
the by-laws of the board of education." Id. § 2566 (McKinney 1970). In addition, section 2590h specifically states that where a power or duty generally provided to the superintendent is
"otherwise provided herein" to another entity the chancellor shall not retain that power.
113. Id. § 2590-h (McKinney 1970), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1976).
114. Id. "Where there is a conflict between the views of the chancellor and those of the
city board as to how the board's policy . . . can best be achieved, the views of the board must
prevail unless they are arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law or State educational policy."
In re Community School Bd. No. 18, 12 [N.Y.] Educ. Dept. Rep. 76, 79-80 (1972).
115. The Chancellor is given all the powers of the superintendent of schools and of the
board of education subject to the restrictions stated in note 112 supra, and in section 2590h(17) of the Education Law.
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education programs and city-wide programs servicing more than
one community district;"' the power to develop a plan for the establishment of a comprehensive high school for each community district;" 7 and the power to establish uniform procedures for record
keeping, accounting, reporting and auditing throughout the city
district."6 In the area of employment the Chancellor must
"[e]nsure compliance with [the] qualifications established for all
personnel employed in the city district,""' 9 "[d]evelop and furnish
pre-service and in-service training programs for [such] employees, "12 and "[aippoint teacher-aides for the schools and programs
under his jurisdiction.''2 Additionally, the Chancellor retains jurisdiction over all custodial employees, 22 and may also employ or retain counsel to act as attorney to the Office of the Chancellor (but
not to the City Board). 23 In the management of the schools and
programs in the city district, he must furnish the community boards
with the results of periodic examinations and evaluations of such
schools and programs. 2 4 Furthermore, he may require periodic reports of the community boards,2 5 and may also "[e]stablish a parents' association or a parent-teachers' association in each school
'2
under [his] jurisdiction."' 1
The Chancellor is given a number of specific functions throughout
116. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590-h(1)-(2) (McKinney 1970). However the Chancellor must
consult with any community board which will be affected by: (1) the substantial expansion
or reduction of such existing schools or programs within the community district; (2) the initial
utilization of a community district school or facility for such a school or program; or (3) the
institution of any new program within the community district. Id. In addition, the Chancellor
may establish or continue voluntary programs under which students may attend a public
school in another community. Id. § 2590-h(7).
117. Such plans are made "[siubject to the approval of the city board." Id. § 2590-h(3)
(McKinney Supp. 1976).
118. Id.§§ 2590-h(21)-(22).
119. Id. § 2590-h(20).
120. Id. § 2590-h(14) (McKinney 1970).
121. Appointments can only be made "within the budgetary allocation therefor." Id. §
2590-h(4).
122. Id. § 2590-h(5).
123. Id. § 2590-h(6).
124. Id. § 2590-h(9).
125. Id. § 2590-h(1i). At least one of these reports must be "an annual report covering
all matters relating to schools under [the community boards'] jurisdiction including, but not
limited to, the evaluation of the educational effectiveness of such schools and programs
connected therewith." Id. § 2590-h(10).
126. Id. § 2590-h(15).
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the city district, which may be delegated to the individual community boards with respect to the schools and programs under their
jurisdiction. These functions include: (1) technical assistance to
community boards; (2) acquisition of necessary warehouse space on
a regional basis (after consultation with the community boards);
and (3) purchasing services on a city-wide, regional or community
27
district basis. 1
The executive powers of the Chancellor are given to him in broad
sweeping language. The decentralization law provides that the
Chancellor shall: (1) "[p]romulgate minimum educational standards and curriculum requirements for all schools and programs
throughout the city district, and. . examine and evaluate periodically all such schools and programs with respect to: (i) maintenance
of such educational standards and curriculum requirements, and
(ii) evaluation of the educational effectiveness of such schools and
programs .... ,;
121 (2) "[p]romulgate such rules and regulations
as he may determine to be necessary or convenient to accomplish
the purposes of [Article 52-A], not inconsistent with the policies of
the city board."; 2 (3) "[p]ossess those [powers] described in section twenty-five hundred fifty-four of [the Education Law], the
exercise of which shall be in a manner not inconsistent with the
policies of the city board."; 30 (4) "[piossess those [powers and
duties] contained in section nine hundred twelve of [the Education
Law] and those provisions of article fifteen thereof which relate to
non-public schools, those contained in sections five hundred twentytwo and five hundred twenty-four of the New York city charter and
those contained in article seventy-three of [the Education Law],
the exercise of which shall be in a manner not inconsistent with the
policies of the city board."''
127. Id. § 2590-h(13).
128. Id.§ 2590-h(8).
129. Id.§ 2590-h(16).
130. Id.§ 2590-h(17). Section 2554 deals with the powers and duties of a city board of
education.
131. Id.§ 2590-h(18). Section 912 deals with health and welfare services to all children in
the city district; article 15 empowers a board of education to designate, purchase and loan
textbooks or supplies within the school district; article 73 entitled "Apportionment of Public
Moneys," encompasses sections 3601-3611 ("General Provisions"), sections 3620-3629 ("State
Aid Transportation Quota"), and section 3635 ("Transportation"); section 522 of the New
York City Charter requires an annual written report from the Board of Education to the
Mayor on the administrative procedures taken in respect to the schools under its jurisdiction
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Finally, the Chancellor of the city district is charged with the
enforcement of all applicable laws, rules or regulations, directives
and agreements between the City Board and the community
boards.'32 He is given authority to ensure that the community
boards' conduct is consistent with the educational and operational
policies of the City Board. He may issue an order requiring the
community board to cease any improper conduct and may enforce
that order by the use of appropriate means, which include:'33
(a) supersession of the community boards by the chancellor or a trustee
appointed by him with respect to those powers and duties of such community
board deemed necessary to ensure compliance with the order; and
(b) suspension or removal of the community board or any member or members thereof.

Thus, the power of both the Chancellor and the City Board to take
action to enforce the policy determinations in the city district, and
the power of the City Board to review determinations of the Chancellor pursuant to that policy are well settled.' These powers encompass both the "resolution of matters crossing Community
School District lines"' 35 and certain intradistrict policy determinations.'36
(e.g., number of schools, attendance figures): "The board of education shall also make in said
reports such suggestions and recommendations relative to the public schools of the city as it
may deem proper." Section 524 of the New York City Charter empowers the board to remove
school officers who are shown to have a direct or indirect interest in any contract with the
public school system or with any of the schools within the system. (This section of the City
Charter is similar in language'and intent to section 2590-g(13-(14) of the Education Law,
recently added by 1975 N.Y. Laws ch. 810, § 1.)
132. N.Y. EDUc. LAW § 2590-1(1) (McKinney 1970); In re Community School Bd. No. 20,
12 [N.Y.] Educ. Dep't Rep. 297 (1973). The Chancellor may delegate any of his administrative or executive functions to such subordinate officers or employees as he deems appropriate.
N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590-h (McKinney 1970), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1976).
133. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590-1(1) (McKinney 1970). The community board or any suspended or removed member may appeal such action of the Chancellor to the City Board
pursuant to section 2590-g(10) of Education Law. Id. § 2590-1(2). See also 8 N.Y.C.R.R. §
113.2 (1976).
134. Kryger v. Board of Educ., 37 App. Div. 2d 622, 323 N.Y.S.2d 777 (2d Dep't 1971); In
re Community School Bd. No. 18, 12 [N.Y.] Educ. Dep't Rep. 76 (1972); In re Community
School Bd. No. 29, 11 [N.Y.] Educ. Dep't Rep. 194 (1972).
135. Kryger v. Board of Educ., 37 App. Div. 2d 622, 623, 323 N.Y.S.2d 777, 780 (2d Dep't
1971).
136. Brown v. Board of Educ., 42 App. Div. 2d 702, 345 N.Y.S.2d 595 (2d Dep't 1973)
(approval by Chancellor of termination of probationary teachers); Sife v. Board of Educ., 65
Misc. 2d 383, 317 N.Y.S.2d 557 (Sup. Ct. 1970) (power to suspend tenured high school teacher
for cause); In re Community School Bd. No. 28, 12 [N.Y.] Educ. Dep't Rep. 31 (1972)
(changes of attendance zones).
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The Community School Boards

The essential element of article 52-A is the community school
board of each community district in the city district.'37 Under section 2590-e, the great bulk of the authority over the city's prekindergarten, nursery, kindergarten, elementary, intermediate, and
junior high schools was allocated to the various community school
districts. This included the general power to "manage and operate
the schools and other facilities under [a district's] jurisdiction."' 35
However, the powers and duties granted the community boards may
not be exercised inconsistently with the other provisions of article
52-A or the policies established by the City Board. 9
Subject to this limitation, the enumerated powers of the community school boards are largely managerial and advisory, 40 except
for the independent authority to employ or retain counsel., The
authority of the community boards to employ a community superintendent and to appoint teacher-aides is subject to the guidelines
established by the Chancellor.'4 2
The administrative functions of the community boards include:
(1) the duty to make repairs to all buildings under its jurisdiction; 4"
(2) the operation of social centers, recreational and extra-curricular
programs,' and cafeterias;' and (3) maintenance of discipline in
137. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590-b(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
138. Id. § 2590-e(4) (McKinney 1970). See Pride v. Community School Bd. No. 18, 482
F.2d 257, 259 (2d Cir. 1973).
139. N.Y. EDUC.LAW § 2590-e (McKinney 1970), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1976).
140. The Legislature realized the limited authority which was being given to the community boards by the select powers and duties of section 2590-e. In granting to the boards
"all the powers and duties, vested by law in, or duly delegated to, the local school board
districts and the board of education of the city district on the effective date of this article,"
it was specifically provided that those powers and duties shall not be limited by the enumeration of the specific powers. Id.
141. Id. § 2590-e(10) (McKinney 1970).
142. Id. §§ 2590-e(1)(a), 2590-e(9) (McKinney 1970), as amended, (McKinney Supp.
1976). Section 2590-j(2) provides that "[tihe Chancellor shall promulgate minimum education and experience requirements for all teaching and supervisory service positions." These
requirements must meet minimum state requirements, and the positions created must be
done so with the approval of the City Board, which is also required for their abolition. Id. §
2590-j(2) (McKinney 1970).
143. Id. § 2590-e(5). Total expenditures for such repairs "[may] not exceed two hundred
fifty thousand dollars in any fiscal year. Expenditures for repairs in excess of this limit shall
be authorized only by the chancellor." Id.
144. Id. § 2590-e(6).
145. Id. § 2590-e(7) (McKinney Supp. 1976). The community may utilize cafeteria serv-
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the schools and programs under their jurisdiction.' The community board also acts as advisor to the Chancellor and the City
Board on construction proposals and building procedures,'47 and
advises the Mayor and the City Council on proposals in connection
with the capital budget.'48
The remaining enumerated powers are executive in nature; the
community boards are given authority without autonomy. A community board has the power to "generally manage and operate the
schools and other facilities under its jurisdiction,"' 49 subject to the
policy determination of the City Board. 50 It has the power to appoint, assign, promote, and discharge all its employees, define their
duties, and fix their compensation and the terms and conditions of
their employment, 5 ' but may not exercise these powers inconsistently with the policies of the City Board. 5 ' Each community board
can "determine matters relating to the instruction of students, including the selection of textbooks and other instructional materials;
provided, however, that such textbooks and other instructional ma' 53
terials shall first have been approved by the chancellor.'
Thus, "[d]espite the delegation of educational responsibility by
the Legislature to the local geographic units comprising community
districts, it is apparent that, pursuant to the provisions of article
52-A, supervisory responsibility for the community districts was
retained by the City Board.'. . ."'" For example, in Community
5 5 the court
School Board No. 22 v. Board of Education,'
held that
the community school board lacked authority, without the approval
of the City Board, to convert intermediate schools to junior high
schools in direct conflict with the established policy of the City
Board with respect to four-year comprehensive high schools., 8
ices for school-related activities and may furnish meals for the elderly, subject to the approval
of the City Board. Id.
146. Id. § 2590-e(8) (McKinney 1970).
147. Id. § 2590-e(11), (13)-(19).
148.

Id. § 2590-e(12).

149. Id. § 2590-e(4).
150. Id. § 2590-e (McKinney 1970), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1976).
151. Id. § 2590-e(2) (McKinney 1970).
152.

Id.

153.
154.
155.
156.

Id.§ 2590-e(3).
Duncan v. Nyquist, 43 App. Div. 2d 630, 631, 349 N.Y.S.2d 154, 157 (3rd Dep't 1973).
44 App. Div. 2d 713, 354 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dep't 1974).
Id. at 714, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 705. Intermediate schools comprise grades 6-8, junior high
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The powers conferred upon the community boards are limited to
those matters relating to the board's district, and one board cannot
unilaterally make a determination that would materially affect another district. 57 "[It is clear that the city board may promulgate
and enforce, as against the various community boards, its basic
policies in matters transcending district boundaries."' 58 Thus, it has
been held that the City Board has primary authority in establishing
a uniform city-wide standard with respect to the hours of instruction
in the public schools,'59 alleviation of racial imbalance,, o formulation of city-wide excessing policies,' 6' regulation of access patterns
to the high schools,' 62 and interpretation of obligations under a
collective bargaining agreement.'63
However, a community board has substantial discretion with respect to the structuring of schools under its jurisdiction and the
establishment of intradistrict policies.' 4 It may modify existing intradistrict organizational patterns to restructure its elementary or
intermediate schools when such modification does not violate state
law or a prevailing policy of the City Board.6 5 But the ultimate
responsibility for making decisions on matters delegated to the community boards continues to rest with the City Board of Education
where consistency of city-wide policy is essential.
IV.
A.

Court Interpretation of the School
Decentralization Law

The Ocean Hill-Brownsville Decisions

Before the enactment of the decentralization law the New York
City Board of Education had established three experimental decenschools comprise grades 7-9. The City Board of Education has retained the control of four
year comprehensive high schools (grades 9-12) throughout the city district. N.Y. EDuc. LAW
§ 2590-g(9) (McKinney 1970). The conversion attempt by Community School Board 22 would
have brought the ninth grade under its supervision.
157. Kryger v. Board of Educ., 37 App. Div. 2d 622, 323 N.Y.S.2d 777 (2d Dep't 1971).
158. In re Parents Ass'n of J.H.S. No. 278, 13 [N.Y.] Educ. Dep't Rep. 249, 250 (1974).
159. New York City School Bds. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 39 N.Y.2d 111, 347 N.E.2d 568,
383 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1976).
160. Kryger v. Board of Educ., 37 App. Div. 2d 622, 323 N.Y.S.2d 777 (2d Dep't 1971).
161. In re Community School Bd. No. 3, 11 [N.Y.] Educ. Dep't Rep. 154 (1972).
162. In re Community School Bd. No. 6, 12 [N.Y.] Educ. Dep't Rep. 164 (1973).
163. In re Community School Bd. No. 6, 13 [N.Y.] Educ. Dep't Rep. 47 (1973).
164. In re Community School Bd. No. 6, 12 [N.Y.] Educ. Dep't Rep. 164 (1973).
165. Id.
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tralized school governing boards within the city district., The development of these districts within the city school system was
marked by political conflicts and confrontation, as the community
districts sought autonomy and the City Board sought to retain central control.' 7
In at least one of these experimental districts-Ocean HillBrownsville-members of an experimental school governing board
were selected. Although these members were not chosen pursuant
to the authority of any statute, the City Board of Education apparently acquiesced in their selection.' At that time the local governing board had no statutory authority in connection with the district
schools and programs, which remained under the City Board's jurisdiction.' The powers of the local board were "advisory only,"'' 0 and
the statute provided that the local board could be removed at the
pleasure of the City Board. 7'
It was this provision which was the basis of the challenge in Ocean
Hill-Brownsville Governing Board v. Board of Education. I In that
166. As early as April 19, 1967, the New York City Board of Education had espoused the
policy of decentralization throughout the city school district. The demonstration districts
were established "to experiment with various forms of decentralization and community involvement." Ocean Hill-Brownsville Governing Bd. v. Board of Educ., 30 App. Div. 2d 447,
448, 294 N.Y.S.2d 134, 136 (2d Dep't 1968), aff'd, 23 N.Y.2d 483, 245 N.E.2d 219, 297
N.Y.S.2d 568 (1969).
167. See, e.g., Council of Supervisory Ass'ns v. Board of Educ., 23 N.Y.2d 458, 245 N.E.2d
204, 297 N.Y.S.2d 547 (1969).
168. Ocean Hill-Brownsville Governing Bd. v. Board of Educ., 30 App. Div. 2d 447, 448,
294 N.Y.S.2d 134, 136 (2d Dep't 1968). Under the then controlling statute, section 2564(2) of
the Education Law (see notes 49-50 supra and accompanying text), the Board of Education
did not have the power to provide for the election of a local school board, but under a grant
from the Ford Foundation an election was held in Ocean Hill-Brownsville on August 3, 1967.
Seven members of the community were elected. "These seven in turn chose five other members. The teaching staff in the eight schools of the district chose four teacher members. The
local administrative staff chose two supervisory members. The members of the board chose
another member." Id.
169. N.Y. EDUc. LAW § 2564(3) (McKinney 1967), as amended, N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2564(3)
(McKinney 1970) gave the local boards advisory powers only; the enabling legislation of 1968
N.Y. Laws ch. 568 did not become effective until June 5, 1968.
170. Ocean Hill-Brownsville Governing Bd. v. Board of Educ., 30 App. Div. 2d 447, 449,
294 N.Y.S.2d 134, 136 (2d Dep't 1968). "On September 4 and 11, 1968 the Board of Education
delegated, subject to the approval of the Board of Regents, certain of its functions to the 33
local school districts created by it. On October 17, 1968 the Board of Regents gave its
approval to this delegation of powers and the creation of the 33 districts." Id. at 450, 294
N.Y.S.2d at 137.
171. N.Y. EDuC. LAW § 2564(2) (McKinney 1970).
172. 30 App. Div. 2d 447, 294 N.Y.S.2d 134 (2d Dep't 1968), alI'd, 23 N.Y.2d 483, 245
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case, the local administrator of the demonstration school project'73
removed a number of teachers in the district from their teaching
assignments, and attempted to transfer them out of the district.
After an administrative hearing, the Superintendent of Schools and
the City Board of Education directed the Governing Board and the
Administrator to reassign the teachers to their former teaching positions. When the Governing Board refused to follow this directive,
the City Board of Education suspended the Governing Board for
thirty days.' The Governing Board sought to compel its reinstatement, and to require the City Board to refrain from further interference with its administration of the district. The supreme court's
dismissal of the action was affirmed by the appellate division
which found that the "local board and its administrator failed and
refused to obey the lawful directives of the Board of Education."'75
This per curiam opinion was unanimously affirmed by the court of
appeals 7 ' which rejected the local board's contention that it was an
elected body that could not be summarily suspended or removed
without procedural due process. " '
The litigation over the suspension of the Ocean Hill-Brownsville
N.E.2d 219, 297 N.Y.S.2d 568 (1969).
173. The administrator was appointed by the Board of Education on September 27, 1967
on the recommendation of the local Governing Board. 30 App. Div. 2d at 449, 294 N.Y.S.2d
at 137.
174. 30 App. Div. 2d at 450, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 137-38. "[T]he suspension of the local board
by the city board was directed by the State Commissioner of Education because the local
board had acted illegally .... In view of the State Commissioner's over-all plenary power,
the city board's action was both proper and required." 23 N.Y.2d at 488, 245 N.E.2d at 222,
297 N.Y.S.2d at 572.
175. 30 App. Div. 2d at 451, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 138-39.
It is the clear intent of the statute . . . and of the decentralization plan with its
delegation of certain functions to local school boards, which has been approved by the
Board of Regents, that all local school boards and their administrators . . even with
respect to the delegated functions and the exercise thereof, are subject to the control,
supervision, and directives of the Board of Education and its Superintendent of
Schools. The Board of Education and its Superintendent are, and were intended to be,
paramount and superior. No local school board, or its administrator, is, or was intended to be, autonomous. Any other result would lead to chaos in the administration
of a unified system of education.
Id., 294 N.Y.S.2d at 139.
176. 23 N.Y.2d 483, 245 N.E.2d 219, 297 N.Y.S.2d 568 (1969).
177. Id. at 488, 245 N.E,2d at 222, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 572. "[I]n the absence of legislation
giving this local board autonomy, a fixed term of office, or a tenure terminable only for cause,
the board is subject entirely both as to its powers and term of office to its creating agency,
the city Board of Education." Id.
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Governing Board reached the court of appeals before the effective
date of article 52-A of the Education Law and after the interim 1968
legislation was in effect. The demonstration projects were creatures
of the City Board of Education and had no power which could be
exercised independently of the City Board. Under the legislation in
existence at the time the alleged cause of action arose, "[n]either
the control nor responsibility for educational affairs . . .[could be]
irretrievably ceded to a local board by the State Board of Regents,
the State Commissioner of Education, or the city board."' 78
The Ocean Hill-Brownsville court summarized the Education
.Law as it applied in the city school district of the city of New York
in January 1969 as follows:' 79
The city board [was] granted by statute all ultimate power over the exercise
of functions and the local board's service [was] at the pleasure of the city
board. True, under the 1968 statute and the permanent plan [Article 52-A],
yet to be approved, local boards [would] have a kind of tenure, but [would]
still be subject to over-all control by the city board and subject to removal
for cause (L. 1968, ch. 568, § 1, subd. 5).

Thus, it was the apparent intent of both the existing and pending
legislation that the City Board would retain plenary power over the
schools of the New York City School District. In general, both the
court opinions and the judicial decisions of the Commissioner of
Education have followed the ruling of the court of appeals in Ocean
Hill-Brownsville holding that the "city board may promulgate and
enforce, as against the various community boards, its basic policies
in matters transcending district boundaries."' 8 0 Thus, in
Community School Board No. 22 v. Board of Education,"' where
the resolution adopted by the community board was in direct conflict with the established policy of the City Board of Education, the
court held that the community board "lacked authority to implement the change in question without the approval of the city board
of education."'8 2 Similarly, in Kryger v. Board of Education,8 ' the
City Board's order superseded a resolution of the community school
178. .Id.
179. Id.
180. In re Parents Ass'n of J.H.S. No. 278, 13 [N.Y.] Educ. Dep't Rep. 249, 250 (1974).
181. 44 App. Div. 2d 713, 354 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dep't 1974).
182. Id. at 714, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 705.
183. 37 App. Div.2d 622, 323 N.Y.S.2d 777 (2d Dep't 1971).
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board which contravened an existing city-wide integration scheme.
The court held the City Board had the authority to override a com84
munity board resolution which was clearly an abuse of power.1
With respect to policy having city district-wide effect, the decentralization law has been interpreted as prohibiting community
board action which contravenes existing policies of the City
Board,8 5 and as empowering the City Board of Education to promulgate city-wide policy determinations which may supersede
established but inconsistent community board resolutions.' 8 It is
apparent that community boards must defer to the City Board when
uniformity of policy throughout the city school district is neces87
sary.
However, the courts generally have recognized the role of the
State Department of Education in determining the over-all administrative policy of the city district.' Where the issue is the "proper
administration of the school system," 88 the courts have recognized
that both the community boards and the City Board are subject to
the plenary power of the Education Department. 0
184. Id. at 623, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 780.
185. Community School Bd. No. 22 v. Board of Educ., 44 App. Div. 2d 713, 354 N.Y.S.2d
703 (2d Dep't 1974); see text accompanying note 183 supra.
186. Kryger v. Board of Educ., 37 App. Div. 2d 622, 323 N.Y.S.2d 777 (2d Dep't 1971);
see text accompanying note 185 supra.
187. In re Community School Bd. No. 3, 11 [N.Y.] Educ. Dep't Rep. 154, 157 (1972).
Accord, Council of Sup'rs and Adm'rs v. Board of Educ., 73 Misc. 2d 783, 342 N.Y.S.2d 398
(Sup. Ct. 1973).
188. Community School Bd. No. 2 v. Lindsay, 71 Misc. 2d 85, 86, 335 N.Y.S.2d 320, 321
(Sup. Ct. 1972).
189. Community School Bd. No. 3 v. Board of Educ., 68 Misc. 2d 826, 830, 328 N.Y.S.2d
535, 540 (Sup. Ct. 1972); Valdivieso v. Community School Bd. No. 1, 67 Misc. 2d 1007, 326
N.Y.S.2d 105 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
190. Community School Bd. No. 3 v. Board of Educ., 68 Misc. 2d 66, 326 N.Y.S.2d 130
(Sup. Ct. 1971). "All of the questions involved in this case are questions which the Commissioner of Education can pass upon in a more informed manner than the courts. Furthermore,
while the courts can only review the questions of law or arbitrariness, the Commissioner of
Education may review questions of discretion and policy. He has 'over-all plenary power'
[citing Ocean Hill-Brownsville] . . . . Thus, if the courts . . . have to act, they will have
before them the discretionary decision of the ultimate repository of discretion in the educational system." Id. at 71, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 136.
In a recent pronouncement on the subject, the United States Supreme Court has stated:
"By and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local
authorities. Courts do not and cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in
the daily operation of school systems and which do not directly and sharply implicate basic
constitutional values." Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). In Epperson, the Court
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B.

The Executive Functions of the Community School Boards
It has been argued that the executive functions 9 ' delegated the
community boards are subject only to broad, general guidelines to
be established by the Chancellor and the City Board, "' and that the
community boards may exercise independent jurisdiction over the
schools in their district as long as their actions and policy decisions
are not inconsistent with those of the City Board. The gist of this
argument is that the central board is charged only with the function
of establishing minimum educational standards, and that the general management and operation of the schools and programs which
meet these minimum standards resides solely in the community
school boards. In Community School Board No. 3 v. Board of
Education,'93 the court recognized the problem which this argument
raises in certain policy areas:"'
With respect to the problems of excessing and tenure ... a strong argument can be made that these are problems that affect more than one community school district and thus must be made subject to centrally determined citywide policies to be established by the City Board of Education ....

On the other hand, the Community Superintendent makes a

did strike down a state statute which made it unlawful for a teacher in any state-supported
school to use a textbook that taught that men are descended from a lower order of animals.
The New York Education Law provides statutory review procedures within the education
system for such situations. Section 2590-I of the Education Law deals with the enforcement
of applicable rules, regulations and directives by the Chancellor and the establishment of an
appeal board within the Department. The authority of the appeal board is set out in section
2590-g(10) of the Education Law, and is determined generally by regulations of the State
Commissioner.
The Rules and Regulations Governing Grievances Against Community School Boards or

Members "provide[s] a nonstatutory administrative review of any grievances not properly
before the [city] board in its appellate capacity [under section 2590-g(10)]." In re Parents
Ass'n of J.H.S. No. 278, 13 [N.Y.] Educ. Dep't Rep. 75, 77 (1973).
191. N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 2590-e(2)-(4) (McKinney 1970); see text accompanying notes 14852 supra.

192. Rebell, supra note 22.
In exercising this broad curriculum power [of section 2590-el, community boards
must, however, comply with state-wide legal and administrative requirements (i.e.,
such as providing instruction in arithmetic, reading, U.S. history, etc.) and with general supervisory standards established by the Chancellor of the City school district and
the City Board pursuant to powers elsewhere granted to these officials to set minimum
educational standards and to evaluate the educational effectiveness of programs in all
schools in the City District [sections 2590-g(1), 2590-h(8)]."
Id. at 7-8.

193. 68 Misc. 2d 66, 326 N.Y.S.2d 130 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
194. Id. at 67, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 132.
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strong plea that the rigid implementation of the Chancellor's guidelines may
wreck some very important special educational programs in the community
district's schools.

The court refused to adopt either policy argument, preferring to
dismiss the petition without prejudice to an appeal for determination by the State Commissioner of Education." 5 The problem arose
again in Council of Supervisors & Administrators v. Board of
Education,9 ' where the question was whether the City Board had
the power to assign excessed supervisors and administrators from
one community school district to another without the consent of the
receiving district. Petitioners argued that the City Board's excessing
rules compelled the community boards to make room for unknown
employees and that the community personnel would be replaced by
administrators having no prior contact with the distrct. In dismissing the petition which sought to enjoin the City Board's excessing
policy, the court observed that different rules for excessing personnel in the various community districts were neither desirable,
permissable nor consistent with sound educational policy.' It concluded that "[t]he power of the city board to manage and control
education affairs (Education Law § 2552) and to determine all policies of the city district (Education Law § 2590-g) also includes the
power to transfer supervisors from one district to another or to headquarters in implementation of a uniform city-wide excessing policy."' 8 Thus, the statutory power of the community school boards
must yield to the paramount authority of the City Board in policy
matters.
An interesting example of this authority relationship between the
community boards and the City Board is the operation of cafeteria
services in each community district. Under article 52-A as originally
adopted, the community boards were given the power and duty to
"operate cafeteria or restaurant services for pupils and teachers.
195. The court held that the dispute, concerning the excessing of teaching personnel,
would best be decided, at least in the first instance, within the educational system. Id. (On
further appeal the Commissioner of Education held that the City Board, as the public employer of all district employees, is authorized to establish uniform criteria for the excessing
of professional personnel by the community boards. In re Community School Bd. No. 3, 11
[N.Y.l Educ. Dep't Rep. 154 (1972)).
196. 73 Misc. 2d 783, 342 N.Y.S.2d 398 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
197. Id. at 787, 342 N.Y.S.2d at 403-04.
198. Id. at 788, 342 N.Y.S.2d at 404-05.
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)1111 By 1972 the transfer of this power had not yet been effected. Community School Board Number 2 brought an action to
compel the Mayor of the City of New York, the director of the
budget, the City Board of Education and the Chancellor to transfer
power and authority over the school lunch program to the community boards and to allocate funds for the operation of the cafeteria services in the schools. 00° A reluctant court 0 ' held that the community board had stated a cause of action to compel the transfer,
since the decentralization law had conferred upon the community
boards "general operational authority" 02 over cafeteria services in
city schools below the high school level within their districts. However, the question was mooted almost immediately by an amendment to the decentralization law,0 3 which provided, inter alia, that
"[sluch utilization shall be subject to the approval of the [city]
board of education."20 1Thus, the authority of the community boards
in the operation of the cafeteria services is no more than managerial
innature.
The type of operational authority to be exercised by the community boards was suggested by Valdivieso v. Community School
Board No. 1,205 and Parents Association, Public School 222 K v.
0 6 both
Community School Board,"
decided within a year following
the effective date of section 2590-e.2 7 The Valdivieso court held that
a local school board was not required to consult with community
groups before selecting a district superintendent.2 01 At the same
time, however, the court recognized that petitioners were entitled
199. N.Y. EDuc. LAw § 2590-e(7) (McKinney 1970), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1976).
200. Community School Bd. No. 2 v. Lindsay, 71 Misc. 2d 85, 335 N.Y.S.2d 320 (Sup.
Ct. 1972).
201. The court concluded that it was being involved, perhaps unnecessarily, in an issue
best left for resolution by the administrative procedures of the State Education Department.
See text accompanying note 186 supra.
202. 71 Misc. 2d at 86, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 321.
203. 1972 N.Y. Laws ch. 772, § 5.
204. 1972 N.Y. Laws ch. 772, § 5 (effective July 1, 1972), amending N.Y. EDuc. LAW §
2590-e(7) (McKinney 1970) (codified at N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590-e(7) (McKinney Supp. 1976)).
The court's opinion in Community School Bd. No. 2 was handed down on April 14, 1972.
205. 67 Misc. 2d 1007, 326 N.Y.S.2d 105 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
206. 66 Misc. 2d 21, 319 N.Y.S.2d 864 (Sup. Ct, 1971).
207. Under 1970 N.Y. Laws ch. 3, § 9, article 52-A took effect July 1, 1970. Valdivieso
was decided November 2, 1970; P.S. 222 K was decided March 26, 1971.
208. 67 Misc. 2d at 1009, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 108. "It may be that the Legislature considered
that the newly elected community boards should and could work out their own procedures,
which this board apparently tried to do." Id.
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to administrative review of the community board's action before the
Chancellor." 9 In Public School 222 K the school's parents association sought a court order directing the community school board to
remove an acting principal, allegedly appointed in violation of the
Education Law. The court held: (1) that sections 2590-d and 2590e(2) did not "specifically or inferentially command that the Community School Board consult with any other group [including a
parents association] prior to appointing or assigning its employees"; 1° and (2) that the judicial proceeding against the community
board was premature where adequate administrative remedies had
not been exhausted."' In both Valdivieso and Public School 222 K,
the courts recognized both the primacy of authority of the community boards within their own districts in making specified decisions and the supervisory power of the City Board and its Chancellor
to review such decisions in order to ensure that operations throughout the city district are consistent with its policies.212
209. Apparently after the judicial proceedings in Valdivieso had been instituted, the
petitioners-residents, and parents of children attending schools within School District
One-sought a review of the Community Board's action by the Chancellor who refused to take
jurisdiction while the court proceeding was pending. The court in Valdivieso dismissed the
petition without prejudice to an administrative review as provided by sections 2590-g(10), and
2590-1 of the Education Law.
210. 66 Misc. 2d at 24, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 867. Section 2590-d of the Education Law required
the community board to establish a parents' association or parent-teachers' association in
each school in the district, and to have "regular communication" with the associations so as
to provide them "with full factual information pertaining to matters of pupil achievement."
The court found that "the Legislature did not give parents' associations any other status or
rights in the decentralized school system." Id. The court limited its holding to appointment
of acting principals and refused to "speculate on the legal result . . . were the board to make
a permanent or long-term appointment [without holding] prior consultations . . . in accordance with its own by-law." Id.
211. Petitioner had not exhausted its administrative remedies since section 2590-(1)
gave the Chancellor power to intervene, and section 2590-g(10) allows appeals to the city
board and then to the Commissioner.
212. The ruling in 222 K that "the Legislature did not give parents' associations any other
status or rights in the decentralized school system" had been extended to hold that parents'
associations and parent-teacher associations had no standing to challenge the validity of citywide policy adopted by the City Board. New York City School Bds. Ass'n v. Board of Educ.,
84 Misc. 2d 237, 239, 375 N.Y.S.2d 978, 983 (Sup. Ct. 1975), but the Appellate Division
rejected that extension on appeal, 50 App. Div. 2d 826, 376 N.Y.S.2d 194, 196 (2d Dep't 1975),
aff'd, 39 N.Y.2d 111, 347 N.E.2d 568, 383 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1976).

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. V

C. Policy Determination and Policy Implementation in the
City District
The generally accepted principle, that the City Board is given the
power and authority to determine city-wide policy and that the
community boards are required to act consistently with those
policies, establishes the framework within which the city school
district must operate. But it does not answer the question of where
policy determination ends and policy implementation begins. Moreover, it has been suggested that the City Board's policy-making
power is limited by the decentralization law and that it should be
subjected to the following criteria:"'
a) "Policy" must refer to broad statements of principles which apply
system-wide, in contrast to detailed regulations concerning specific programs
or decisions.
b) Only those general powers of the community boards incorporated by
reference in the introductory paragraph to N. Y. Ed. Law §2590-e are explicitly made subject to the policy-making power of the City Board. Established
canons of statutory interpretation hold that the specific must prevail over the
general. Therefore, it should be presumed that other [sub]sections of the law
which set forth in detail the specific powers of the community boards, the
Chancellor, and the City Board (such as those concerning curriculum and
budgetary matters) are complete in themselves and make unnecessary any
reference to the general grant of city board policy-making power appearing
elsewhere in the statute.
c) Any "policies" to be imposed on community boards must be formally
adopted after due consideration of views presented by interested parties at
public meetings of the City Board.

The term "policy," when applied in the context of the Education
Law, arguably refers to the general principles to be followed in the
management of educational affairs; and standing alone, it may be
argued that the City Board is limited by the terms of the enabling
legislation to the pronouncement of broad educational goals and
structural guidelines. However, the power of the City Board to "determine all policies of the city district"21 does not stand alone. The
City Board is also given "all the powers and duties the interim board
of education ...had on the effective date of [article 52-A]." 1 5
213. See Rebell, supra note 22, at 10, who adapts these criteria from the plaintiffs brief
in Community School Bd. No. 3 v. Board of Educ., 66 Misc. 2d 739, 321 N.Y.S.2d 949 (Sup.
Ct. 1971), aff'd, 38 App. Div. 2d 932, 330 N.Y.S.2d 167 (1st Dep't 1972).
214. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590-g (McKinney 1970), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1976).
215. Id.
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The interim board of education was created to supervise the transition of the city school district into a community school district
system and it retained all the section 2554 powers of the previous
Board of Education of the city school district of the city of New
York."1 6 Section 2554 gives the Board of Education power (1) "[t]o
prescribe such regulations and by-laws as may be necessary.

. .

for

the general management, operation, control, maintenance and discipline of the schools ... .";111 and(2) to delegate "any of its admin-

istrative and ministerial powers to the superintendent of schools
[now the Chancellor].

...
"I,In addition, when the City Chancel-

lor assumed the powers and duties of his office under article 52-A,
it was specifically provided that he would "exercise such powers and
discharge such duties in a manner not inconsistent with the general
policies formulated by, and the specific determinations of, the interim board within the scope of their authority." ' Since the powers
of the Chancellor included "those described in section twenty-five
hundred fifty-four [of the Education Law], the exercise of which
shall be in a manner not inconsistent with the policies of the city
board," ' it is clear that the City Board was intended to be more
than a supervisory agency: the powers of the Chancellor are concurrent with those of the City Board, but the Chancellor may not
exercise those powers inconsistently with the City Board. Therefore,
while the City Board is charged with the broad policy-making powers of section 2590-g, it does not exercise those powers to the exclusion of the specific powers given it as the successor to the interim
board of education.
The second criterion suggested above, that the specific powers
granted the community boards by section 2590-e are not subject to
the general policy-making power of the City Board, is directly refuted by the preamble to that section."' After explicitly stating that
all the powers and duties with respect to the control and operation
of the schools under the jurisdiction of the community boards shall
216. 1969 N.Y. Laws ch. 330, § 11, as amended, 1969 N.Y. Laws, ch. 442, § 4, as amended,
1970 N.Y. Laws ch. 3, § 8.
217. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2554(13)(a) (McKinney 1970).
218. Id. § 2554(13)(b). Paragraph (b) applies only "[in a city having a population of one
million or more," of which New York City is the only one in New York State.
219. 1969 N.Y. Laws ch. 330, § 11 (emphasis added).
220. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590-h(17) (McKinney 1970).
221. Id. § 2590-e (McKinney 1970), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1976).
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not be exercised inconsistently with the policies established by the
City Board, the introductory paragraph of section 2590-e provides
that this limitation shall in no way be affected by the enumeration
of the specific community board powers of that section. 2
Contrary to the inference of the third suggested criterion, City
Board policies are not imposed on the community boards. The City
Board has the power and the duty to "[hiold public hearings on
any matter relating to the educational welfare of the city school
district or other matters within the scope of its responsibilities
whenever required to do so by law, or whenever in its judgment the
'
public interest will be served."223
Such public meetings are not a
requirement for adoption of city-wide policy and are within the
discretion of the City Board. 2 4
The extent of the policy-making authority of the city school board
was considered in Community School Board No. 3 v. Board of
Education."5 In that case, the community board sought to enjoin
the City Board and its Chancellor from interfering with the determination of how federal Title I funds2 6 should be used. The City Board
argued that "the decentralization law gives the City School Board
ultimate policymaking authority, even as to Title I funds." 2 7 The
222. Id. Cf. Reyes v. Community School Bd. No. 14, N.Y.L.J., June 24, 1971, at 14, col.
8. Reyes held that the adjustment of a teacher's probationary period by a community school
board was ultra vires and that the grant of tenure to personnel who had less than the probationary period specified in the City Board's by-law was null and void. In its opinion the court
suggested, but did not decide, that powers granted to the community boards by sections of
the Education Law other than section 2590-e would not be subject to the over-all authority
of the City Board. But see, New York City School Bds. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 84 Misc. 2d
237, 245, 375 N.Y.S.2d 978, 986-87 (Sup. Ct. 1975), modified, 50 App. Div. 2d 826, 376
N.Y.S.2d 194 (2d Dep't 1975), aff'd, 39 N.Y.2d 111, 347 N.E.2d 568, 383 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1976).
223. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590-g(4) (McKinney 1970).
224. The court in New York City School Bds. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 84 Misc. 2d 237,
375 N.Y.S.2d 978 (Sup. Ct. 1975), could find no mandatory provision requiring the "Board
of Education to conduct a public meeting prior to proclaiming a statement of educational
policy; any contrary holding would be impracticable." Id. at 246, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
225. 66 Misc. 2d 739, 321 N.Y.S.2d 949 (Sup. Ct. 1971), aff'd, 38 App. Div. 2d 932, 330
N.Y.S.2d 167 (1st Dep't 1972).
226. "Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (U.S. Code, tit. 20
§ 241a et seq.) provides for assistance to local educational agencies for the education of
educationally deprived children of low-income families." 38 App. Div. 2d at 932, 330 N.Y.S.2d
at 168 (McGivern, J., dissenting). Under the statute funds are released to the states by the
federal government and transmitted to the "local educational agencies."
227. 66 Misc. 2d at 741, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 951. The community board argued that it had
the right to determine how the funds should be used; the City Board maintained that it had
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court rejected this argument, holding that under section 2590-i(14)
(d) of the Education Law, the community board had been given
"power by the state legislature to determine the use of Title I funds
without review by the Chancellor or the City Board of the merits of
particular proposals." ' The court based its holding on a four-part
analysis of section 2590-i(14)(d): (1) "[O]nly the Community
School Board is given the right to submit proposals for the use of
Title I funds";229 (2) "The chancellor is given the right to review the
proposals submitted to him 'as to form only' . . . and he must
promptly transmit the proposals to the funding agency"; 30 (3) The
City Board is given no role in the review of the proposals; 3' (4)
"[T]he language that 'community boards shall not be considered
local educational agencies' . . . means [only] that an individual
Community Board cannot, on its own, submit proposals to the funding agency." 32
The court's holding that the City Board's overall policy-making
authority did not extend to the merits of a community board's proposal for federal funding was upheld by the appellate division,3
despite a vigorous dissent by Mr. Justice Owen McGivern in which
he interpreted the statutory language of Section 2590-i as specifically prohibiting the Community Boards from qualifying as local
educational agencies.234 The court's decision in Community School
the power to mandate that a portion of the funds be used for specific programs and that the
community board could determine the use to which the remainder was to be put. Id. at 740,
321 N.Y.S.2d at 951.
228. Id. Section 2590-i(14)(d) provides in part:
"[ln the case of special [federall funds allocated to the city district on a formula
basis, [the community board mayl submit proposals to the chancellor for a review as
to form only and prompt transmittal to the funding agency; provided, however, that
in the case of such special funds community boards shall not be considered local
educational agencies; and provided further that the total amount of such proposals
submitted by any community board shall not exceed the amount of an apportionment
made by the chancellor on the basis of a formula determined by the city board . . .
after consultation with community boards and the mayor....
N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590-i(14)(d) (McKinney 1970).
229. 66 Misc. 2d at 741, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 951.
230. Id., 321 N.Y.S.2d at 952.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 742, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 952.
233. 38 App. Div. 2d 932, 330 N.Y.S.2d 167 (1st Dep't 1972).
234. Id. at 933, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 169. "Thus, although local involvement in education is
encouraged and fostered, the City Board remains paramount; and in respect of Federal funds,
a community board is specifically debarred from ever exercising unfettered discretion as to
their use and expenditure." Id.
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Board No. 3 ignores the letter of the decentralization law in attempting to capture its spirit,"' for as Justice Mr. McGivern said,
"[despite] the laudable intent of stimulating local involvement
• . .nevertheless both the State and Federal statutes envisage that
the 'policy making powers' remain ultimate and intact in the overall City Board. . .in order to insure some uniformity of community
practices and a more ready accountability."2 ,,
Thus, the City Board continues to serve as the "local educational
agency" for the entire city school district. "It is given the right to
draw up the formula by which [Title I] funds are apportioned to
' using a formula which
the different school districts in the city,"237
238
'
calculates the "citywide poverty index," and then distributing the
funds to the individual districts.23 The result is substantial control
of the use of these federal funds by the City Board (the initial
depository of the funds) as contemplated by both the state and
federal legislation.240
D.

The New York City School Boards Association Decisions

Recently, various individual community school boards, the New
York City School Boards Association, parents associations from several community districts and individual parents of children attending schools in the city district have challenged the policy-making
authority of the City Board and its Chancellor over the community
districts in a series of cases in both the state and the federal
courts.21
235. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act was passed in 1965 and utilizes the
term "local educational agencies" in establishing the funding procedure. The New York
decentralization law was passed in 1969 and the section which deals specifically with federal
funding in the nature of the 1965 federal legislation states, "in the case of such special funds
community boards shall not be considered local educational agencies." N.Y. EDUC. LAW §
2590-i(14)(d) (McKinney 1970). The later state statute was phrased to exclude the community school boards from the earlier federal statute's ambit by specifically not considering
them local educational agencies. See id. § 2590-i(14)(a).
236. 38 App. Div. 2d at 933, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 169.
237. 66 Misc. 2d at 741, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 952.
238. "Central board's rules cost Island schools Title I funds," STATEN ISLAND ADVANCE
January 17, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
239. Id. "Before distributing allocated federal funds to the receiving district, the central
board takes 4.4 per cent of the total off the top for administrative overhead." Id.
240. State Assemblyman Guy V. Molinari is proposing legislation which would designate
decentralized school districts within the City of New York as their own "local educational
agencies." Id.
241. New York City School Bds. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 84 Misc. 2d 237, 375 N.Y.S.2d
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In September 1975 the City Board had reached a compromise
collective bargaining agreement with the teachers' union whereby it
shortened the instructional day for pupils throughout the city district by two forty-five minute periods a week. Pursuant to this agreement the Chancellor issued a directive to all the community boards
requiring compliance in every district. Some of the community
boards sought to enjoin implementation of the Chancellor's directive, arguing that "instructional powers, including the length of the
school day, are vested by law in the community school boards, and
as such, they cannot be taken away from the community boards by
other governmental agencies." 4 ' The court rejected this contention 43 holding: (1) "the policy decision with respect to the length of
the school day is the proper function of the city board and not the
prerogative of the community boards";4 and (2) "under the statutory structure of the decentralization law, educational issues of citywide import, as distinguished from strictly local questions, are to be
determined by the city board." 2" After the appellate division modified and affirmed 4 ' the judgment petitioners appealed to the court
2 47

of appeals.

The issue before the court was the extent of the City Board's
policy-making authority and its effect on the management and operation of schools under the jurisdiction of the community boards.
The court concluded that the decentralization law created a situation where the respective authorities of the City Board and the
community boards overlapped on key points, leading to conflicting
978 (Sup. Ct. 1975); see also, Zoll v. Anker, 414 F. Supp. 1024 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). For cases
where the parents of school children have sought to enjoin the exercise of authority by
community school boards, see Pride v. Community School Bd. No. 18, 482 F.2d 257 (2d Cir.
1973) and Pride v. Community School Bd. No. 18, 488 F.2d 321 (2d Cir. 1973).
242. 84 Misc. 2d at 243, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 984. "The Community School Boards contend
that under decentralization they were entrusted with broad, general powers over the everyday
workings of the schools under their charge, including the power [to determine the length of
the school dayl." Id. at 243-44, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 985.
243. Id. at 244, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 985.
244. Id. at 243, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 985.
245. Id. at 244, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 985.
246. 50 App. Div. 2d 826, 376 N.Y.S.2d 194 (2d Dep't 1975). "While it is generally within
the power of State education officials to fix mandatory minimum hours of daily instructional
time, in the absence of the exercise of that power by such officials, the Central Board of
Education of the City of New York may determine the number of hours of instructional time
to be provided in that city's public schools." Id. at 827, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 196.
247. 39 N.Y.2d 111, 383 N.Y.S.2d 208, 347 N.E.2d 568 (1976).

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. V

interpretations of where the power lay. 48 However, the issue turned
on a determination of whether the statutory principle of decentralization contemplated the extension of the authority of the City
Board beyond the prescription of minimum standards to the establishment of specific policy.249
The court determined that the City Board and its Chancellor
have the responsibility for establishing policy having city-wide impact, and that the general power of the community boards to manage and control the schools of their districts is limited to matters
relating to their districts alone and must be exercised consistently
with the policies established by the City Board.25
Based on that determination the court held that absent state
regulation or restriction, the City Board of Education has the power
to establish a uniform city-wide policy or standard with respect to
the hours of instruction in the public schools. 5 '
The court recognized that the authority of the City Board to
establish city-wide policy was subject to "minimum educational
standards mandated by a higher authority [i.e., the Board of Re'
Absent the progents or the State Commissioner of Education]."25
mulgation of such standards, the State Education Department had
not preempted the field and the City Board could not be prohibited
from reducing the hours of instruction, as a function of its exercise
25 3
of the educational policy-making authority vested in it by statute.
Six days after the court of appeals' decision, the Community
School Board of District Number 3 directed the schools in its district to remain open for the full school day. After unsuccessful
N.Y.S.2d at 211, 347 N.E.2d at 572.
N.Y.S.2d at 213, 347 N.E.2d at 574.
383 N.Y.S.2d at 213, 347 N.E.2d at 573-74. The court noted that
management and control of educational affairs in the State is vested
in the Board of Regents and Commissioner of Education." Id. at 116, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 211,
347 N.E.2d at 571.
251. Id. at 115, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 210-11, 347 N.E.2d at 571.
252. Id. at 122, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 214, 347 N.E.2d at 575. This theory was espoused by the
appellate division. See note 246 supra.
253. The court noted that, as of the date of its decision, the State Education Department
had not exercised its power to prescribe a minimum number of instructional hours per day
or per week, although on September 1, 1976, the State Education Commissioner's regulations
concerning minimum hours of instruction would go into effect. "[Until that time, the board
appears to have been free, within the limits of whatever mandated minimum educational
standards now exist, to bargain over the number of hours of instruction." Id. at 122, 383
N.Y.S.2d at 214-15, 347 N.E.2d at 575.
248. Id. at 117, 383
249. Id. at 120, 383
250. Id. at 119-20,
"ItIhe ultimate general
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reconciliation attempts, the Chancellor exercised his authority
under section 2590-1 of the Education Law to supersede the community board and appoint a trustee to comply with the directive of
the City Board."'4 This led to a protest demonstration by the parents
in District 3 in an attempt to prevent enforcement of the directive.255
At the same time the parents of children attending Public School
Number 75 in District Number 3 commenced an action in federal
district court alleging violation of due process and a denial of equal
protection. 5 The court rejected the constitutional arguments and
accepted the state court decision as resjudicata in denying a preliminary injunction. 57 The court concluded, "It is the City Board that
is vested with power to determine city wide educational policy applicable to all local boards. .

.

. While parents may disagree and

sincerely challenge the wisdom of the policy decisions, the responsibility was that of the City Board." 58
E.

Summary
The courts of New York State have been grappling with the concept of decentralization since before the city school district was
restructured by article 52-A. However, in both the series of decisions
arising from the Ocean Hill-Brownsville demonstration project in
1968-69, and in the Community School Board of District Number 3
decisions in 1975-76, the courts have been in basic agreement in
interpreting the intent of the decentralization law. In the management and control of the city's schools, the City Board of Education
shall determine all policies of the city district.
V. Conclusion
The New York City School Decentralization Law has been criticized as a "patchwork and highly ambiguous law."2' '
Often the legislation grants the same power to both the City
Board (and its Chancellor) and the community boards. 6 ' However,
254. See text accompanying notes 132-33 supra.
255. 414 F. Supp. 1024, 1026 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
256. Id. at 1025.
257. Id. at 1027.
258. Id. at 1029.
259. Rebell, supra note 22, at 1.
260. For example, the introductory paragraph of section 2590-e of the Education Law
provides that "fejach community board shall have all the powers and duties, vested by law

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. V

the delegation of power is subject to the principle which apparently
makes the City Board the repository of overall educational authority
in the city. Section 2590-g of the Education Law provides that it
shall be the prerogative of the City Board to determine the policies
of the city district; section 2590-h directs the Chancellor to exercise
the powers enumerated in that section in a manner not inconsistent
with the policies of the City Board; section 2590-e defines the powers
and duties of the community school district boards and provides
that their powers shall be exercised in a manner consistent with the
policies of the City Board."6 ' Thus, although the statutory language
grants powers which overlap, the primary authority rests in the City
Board.2
The community boards are given management and control only
of the schools under their jurisdiction. This power is coextensive
with that of the City Board when it is exercised consistently with
that Board's policies. But when the policies diverge, the independence of community board authority ends, and the general management of the schools by the community school boards is subordinated
to the overall statutory authority of the City Board. The dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice McGivern in Community School Board No.
263 although dealing
3 v. Board of Education,
with the use of federal
funds, is also applicable to the role of the decentralization law in
the New York City School District. He stated: 6"
The wisdom of this legislative scheme and design is apparent. Otherwise, we
could have 31 different and independent satrapies, all competing for limited
funds and yet operating without let or hindrance, resulting in a crazy-quilt
of variegated and unsupervised practices, no matter how innovative, experimental, untried or bizarre. . . .Thus, although I recognize the laudable
intent of stimulating local involvement . . . nevertheless [the statute envisages] that the 'policy making powers' remain ultimate and intact in the overin, or duly delegated to, the local school board districts and the board of education of the
city district [with respect to the specified schools]." N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590-e (McKinney
Supp. 1976). At the same time, section 2590-h (17) provides that the chancellor shall
"[plossess those [powersi described in section twenty-five hundred fifty-four [which prescribes the powers and duties of the city board of education]." Id. § 2590-h(17) (McKinney
1970).
261. In re Parents Ass'n of J.H.S. No. 278, 13 [N.Y.] Educ. Dep't Rep. 249, 249-50 (1974).
262. New York City School Bds. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 39 N.Y.2d 111, 117, 347 N.E.2d
568, 572, 383 N.Y.S.2d 208, 211 (1976).
263. 38 App. Div. 2d 932, 330 N.Y.S.2d 167 (1st Dep't 1972).
264. Id. at 933, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 169 (McGivern, J., dissenting).
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all City Board . . .in order to ensure some uniformity of community practices ....

The extent of the administrativepowers 5 delegated to the community boards under the decentralization law has rarely been challenged in court. The Chancellor's powers which involve him in the
supervision and control of the community boards are the subject of
the most heated litigation. The courts have noted that the major
elements of the continuing controversy between the community
boards and the City Board are power and money,"' and they are
quick to criticize when the power struggle detracts from the responsibility of the educational system to provide for the educational
welfare of the children. 7
Long before the establishment of the New York City decentralized
school system, it had been recognized that the Education Law was
intended to impose upon a board of education only general duties
connected with setting up and maintaining an education system in
the city. 8 Accordingly, it was not intended that the board assume
the direct responsibility of enforcing rules, reaching down into each
classroom of the school system to provide in detail for the type of
activities and qualifications of individual teachers and administrators." 9
School districts have only such powers as are delegated by the
Legislature. 70 In article 52-A the Legislature delegated to the community school boards all the powers and duties previously vested in
"the local school board districts and the board of education of the
city district" '' for the control and management of the schools under
265. See text accompanying notes 143-48 supra.
266. Council of Sup'rs & Adm'rs v. Board of Educ., 73 Misc. 2d 783, 784, 342 N.Y.S.2d
398, 400, (Sup. Ct. 1973), afid, 35 N.Y.2d 861, 322 N.E.2d 273, 363 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1974).
267. New York City School Bds. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 39 N.Y.2d 111, 122, 347 N.E.2d
568, 575, 383 N.Y.S.2d 208, 215 (1976). "In all of this imbroglio, and those which may follow,
the primary concern should be the students, and not the . . . parties to the power or ideological struggle between public entities created by overlapping statutes performing parallel fiduciary responsibilities." Id.
268. Luce v. Board of Educ., 2 App.Div. 2d 502, 505, 157 N.Y.S.2d 123, 127 (3d Dep't
1956), aff'd, 3 N.Y.2d 792, 143 N.E.2d 797, 164 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1957). These general duties
related to properties, policies, general course of study, and employment of qualified and
competent persons. 2 App. Div. 2d at 505, 157 N.Y.S.2d at 127.
269. 2 App. Div. 2d at 505, 157 N.Y.S.2d at 127.
270. Cook v. Griffin, 47 App. Div. 2d 23, 26, 364 N.Y.S.2d 632, 636 (4th Dep't 1975).
271. N.Y. Enuc. LAW § 2590-e (McKinney 1970), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1976).
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their jurisdiction. But "[w]hether this blanket transmission of
power means what it says is open to question." 7 ' After the recent
extension of the authority of the City Board to establish specific
requirements within all community districts 7 3 rather than a prescription of minimum standards for the entire district, it is difficult
to imagine many matters which cannot be encompassed by the
broad umbrella of "city-wide policy." If the City Board can show
that a particular action by a community board-even the hiring of
a particular individual-carries some city-wide import, then it may
impose its determination, preempting the community board. Any
conflict between the City Board and a community board which
involves a question of proper administration of the educational system throughout the city school district of the city of New York
would necessarily have to be resolved in favor of the New York City
Board of Education.
Kenneth R. McGrail
272. Community School Bd. No. 3 v. Board of Educ., 68 Misc. 2d 826, 830, 328 N.Y.S.2d
535, 539 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
273. See notes 241-58 supra and accompanying text.

